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THE COMITY OF INTER-STATE EXTRADITION
OF FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.

George Dallas Stanton Jr.

From the time when the thirteen colonies sent delegates to the first Continental Congress in 1774, and entered into a "mutual pledge of united action" to resist the
ministerial policy of England, down to the present day, the
relation of the States to the Central Government, and of the
several States to each other, has been a subject of the
greatest importance to our union.

During this period there

has been a class of people, who have striven to maintain the
Sovereignty and independance of the State, as against the
United States; but the fallacy of this theory was shown,
when South Carolina in 1831 openly advocated the right of a
State to nulify an act of Congress, and it was conclusively
established, by the Civil War.

Those claiming the sover-

eignty of the State declared that the relation of the States
to each other was that of International Comity, and this
word surviving the downfall of that theory has been grossly
misapplied in defining the duties, rights, and privileges of
I the respective States down to the present day.

In the

subject of, the so called, Inter-State Extradition we find
one of the incidents of its misapplication.

Here Comity

has claimed a most important part and has mislead both judge
and lawyer in interpreting Article IV, Section 2, clause 2
of the United States Constitution.

Sedgwick (Statutory and

Constitutional Law) states the following, on this subject,-

"The doctrine of Comity has been established and applied by
powers wholly foreign, entirely distinct from, and independent of each other, the mutual relations of whose citizens
are comparatively rare and almost if not quite, exclusively
commercial, and the rules of whose intercourse rests entirely on the great unwritten law of nations, of which this
Comity forms in fact but a part. Such is not at all the conThey are mutually dependent

dition of the United States.

on each other in various ways, and all recognize in certain
cases a common sovereign

.

.

.

and they have undertaken by

means of a carefully prepared instrument to declare with
precision their relative rights and duties.
substitute for the clear

In this case to

language of the Constitution

anything so vague and uncertain as the Comity of Nations, is
not only to subject the relations, and independence of the
States to a condition of alarming perplexity, but to make
the judiciary the sole arbiter of the gravest political
questions, and to give them, in framing decisions no better
guide than a fluctuating and unsettled notion of international Comity.f" Judge Cooley in his work# on the "Principles of
' Constitutional Law" (178) says: "It often happens that a
right asserted or privilege claimed in one State will depend
for its validity upon something done by the parties concerned, in some other State, whereby the right or privilege be-

came initiate,

or perhaps perfected. .

.

.

. In these eases

the questions which arise are questions of comity, and they
are governed by the same rules as they would be if the two
States had been to each other foreign nations".

But furthe"

on (183) he admits that there is a clause in the Constitution providing that "Full faith and credit shall be given in
each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State," and that Congress may legislate on this provision.

It is apparent, therefore, that in

thus attempting to retain this word in defining the relations of the States, not only has the relation of State to
State been confounded as being synonymous to that of sovereign nations, but it has had the effect of causing the
greatest confusion among our legislators, and, even in the
Supreme Court of the United States (Prigg V. The Commonwealth of Penn. ,16 Peters, 539 as against, Kentucky V.
Dennison, 24 How.j68) in construing the power given to the
National Congress by the United States Constitution.
EXTRADITION.
Before the epoch of the Constitution many enlightened rulers had on various occasions refused to extend the
protection of their sovereignty over criminals fleeing from
justice; but still in theory, among writers upon public law,
the obligation to make such surrender was by many regarded

as one of a questionable character.

No one doubted that a

nation had the right to deliver up a criminal to justice,
but the positive duty to do so as a part of the doctrine of
the law of nations, was by no means universally conceded.
Besides this imperfection, the grade of the crime which created this imperfect obligation to give up the offender,
could not in the nature of things but be a point of perplexing uncertainty.

As a matter of fact, there has been only

one case (that of Arguelles, in 1864) in the history of the
United States in which a rendition has been made, without a
treaty stipulation to that effect between the United States
and the nation seeking the delivery and return of the fugitive.

Spear in his work on Extradition says that-"All of'

the cases show that the international surrender of fugitive
criminals, except as provided for by treaty, has no basis
or sanction in the usages of the United States."

It must

be conceded, therefore, that the rules of international law
on this point would not have been adequate to the exigencies
arising from the consolidation of the several States of the
Republic into one

ation, We find that before this event,

the evils resulting from the absence of a definite rule on
the subject had given rise to a treaty stipulation between
the New England Colonies in 1643; and again, for the same
purpose, a provision in the Articles of Confederation; and
finally, in Article IV Section 2, of the Constitution of 1789.

* The purpose then,

of this provision in

the Constitution was,

in view~of the preceding facts, to accomplish three objects:
FIRST
To impose an absolute obligation on each State to surrender
'

criminals fleeing from the justice of another State, and
SECOND
To define clearly the class of criminals so to be surrendered, and,
THIRD
To vest in Congress the requisite power to regulate the
means by which this provision should be carried out between
the several States of the Union.

In the firstiand second,

the rules of international comity were defective and the design was consequently to createta substitute without these
defects.

As to the third, the power of deciding whether a

fugitive from a sister State should, or should not be surrendered was necessarily a part of the powers thus granted
to the general government, for when the people of the States
in convention assembled, discussed, and ratified the Constitution, history tells us that they were aware of the defezts
in the preceding Articles of Confederation, and of therlack oi
power there given to the central government to protect the
State and its citizens, and even the members of the Congress
itself.

The fact of the violent struggle in several of the

State Conventions, bears evidence to us that the people
realized that in order for the central government to protect
the union, and the "life", *liberty", and 'property" of its
citizens, it must have the adequate powers for legislation,
and, for the enforcement of such legislation:

In other

words, there must be a mutual concession of authority by
each State to the General Government.

Such being the case,

and having in mind the inability of the Congress of the
Confederation to enforce its own provisions, how can it be
doubted that, in the ratification of the constitution by the
states, for the purpose of "securing justice, domestic tranquility, and a common defense," it was intended that Congress should be competent to legislate and to carry out its
legislation, to the exclusion of a single State.

The public

importance of a correct construction of the provisions of
law which regulate this delicate relation between the States
is self-evident.

There is no doubt that in some of the

States the practice in rendition cases is based on the prin'

ciple that the executive may lawfully exercise a judicial

[

discretion, and may institute an inquiry upon points not
specially within the law of 1798; and a few of the States

! have Statutes based on that theory.

In many States, on the

contrary, a different theory is held; and hence, since under present conditions a State has no remedy in case of

refusal, however unsatisfactory the reasons on which it is
based may seem, the result is that grave misunderstandings
often arise, and renditions are sometimes altogether suspended between two States by way of retaliation for a refusal,
in consequence of which, criminals go free and the ends of
justice are defeated.

In such cases this important provi-

sion is no longer a "bond of peace and union, but a source
of controversy and irritating discussion."

These undesira-

ilble consequences arise from a want of uniformity in the construction of the law and their occurrence would be obviated
by a settlement of that construction upon a sound and uniform basis.

The source and history of this provision indi-

cate an intention to make it one of perfect obligation and
unc ondit ionally.

James Madison (Madison's Writings 66) in reply to a

letter written by Edmund Randolph on a case of extradition
between Virginia and South Carolina in 1784, after saying
that if each one of the compilers of the text had been asked
to disclose his meaning, the answers would have been as various as the comments made upon it; he proceeds: "Waiving
the doctrine of the confederation my present view

..

would admit of few exceptions to the propriety of surrendering fugitive offenders.

My reasons are these

First; By the express terms of the union the citizens of

every State are naturalized within all the others, and being
entitled to the same privileges, may with the more justice
be subjected to the same penalties.

This circumstance ma-

terially distinguishes the citizens of the United States from
the subjects of other nations not so incorporated.
Second; The analogy of the laws throughout the States ....
seems to obviate the capital objections against removal to
the State where the offence is charged.'

In the case

against removals to England it was based on very different
i grounds.

In that

case the accused was deprived of his

right to a trial by jury of the vicinage, and his witnesses
could not be had.
Third; Unless citizens are given up they cannot be tried
anywhere, and it seems to be for the common interest of the
State that a few hours, or at most a few days, should not
be sufficient to gain a sanctuary, .

.

.

. in a word, expe-

rience will show, if I mistake not, that the relative situation of the United States calls for a "Droit Public" much
more minute than that comprised in the Federation Articles."
These words from so eminent a member of the Philadelphia
Convention as James Madison are of the greatest importance
in helping us to determine as to what were the intentions of
the framers of that provision in our Constitution relating
to the rendition of fugitives; in fact, this is the only

expression of opinion of any kind that can be found on that
subject; but, from the fact that it was written to one who
was also a member of that Oonvention, and of its non disputation, we may presume it to have been the intention express
ed by Mr.Madison, and that the particular object to be effected by the clause in question was to supply the defect in
the administration of criminal justice resulting from the
rule that courts have no control over offenses committed
beyond their jurisdiction,

The State to which the crimi-

nal escapes having no power to try the offense it was enjoined by the Constitution to surrender him in order that
within the United States, the administration of criminal
justice might be perfect.

The obligation on the State to surrender
criminals fleeing from justice.
The Constitution was not formed merely to guard the
State against danger from foreign nations, but mainly to
secure union and harmony at home; for if this object could
be obtained there would be but little danger from abroad,
and to accomplish this purpose the statesmen who framed the
I

Constitutionfel,

and also the people who adopted it, that

it was necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty
should be ceded to the general government, and that in the

sphere of action assigned to 4-

it should be supreme, and

strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals,
without interruption from a State, or from State authority,
It was evident that anything short of this would
be inadequate to the main objects for which the government
was established; and that local interests, local prejudices,
or passions, incited and fostered by individuals for sinister purposes, would lead to acts of aggression and injustice
by one State on the rights of another,

which would ultimate-

ly terminate in resistance and force, unless there was a
common arbiter between them, armed with power enough to protect and guard the rights of all, by appropriate laws,
And hence; in the ratification of the Constitution, we find
the recognition by the several States of the absolute obligation imposed upon them in the clause providing that

.

person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other
crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another
State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to
lI

the State having jurisdiction of the crime."
SMfta itka

'

in the case of In re, Perry, II Criminal Law

Magazine 84, says; "In those instances where fugitives were
delivered up previous to the confederation, it is believed

i

that it was done wholly through the intervention of the

courts, and that the chief executive of the State was not a
party to such proceedings".

The shallowness of this theory

is self evident, for we know what the arbitrary will of the
govermor was during the colonial period, and the weakness of
the judiciary: That private ends were more likely to be
satisfied than justice: And that, at no time, where matters
between the colonies were concerned, did the judiciary assume control, nor were their decisions final.

The provision

in the Articles of Confederation was, it seems, always deemed to be a matter of executive discretion; but, when the
framers of the Constitution put in essentially the same
clause and it was accepted by the State the idea of Oexecutive discretion" was totally lost sight of.

This we find

by a reference to the cases of practice at different times
during the early period of the Republic.

It was not until

about 1830 that the idea of "executive discretion" began to
be promulgated, but after that time there was a steady development, of the theory, and the cause of this is attributed
to the connection of this clause in the act of 1793 with
that providing for the rendition of fugitive slaves.
r

An

illustration of this is shown in the hisLory of Massachusetts
legislation.

"For a few years after the passage of the

act of 1793 no legislation was had, then in 1801 a6 a

uviod

still a)mosc contempo aneous With the passage of uhe ac.

uf

Congress, and the adoption of the Constitution, an act was
passed (in Massachusetts) simply making obligatory upon the
governor by State law, what the Constitution and law of 1793
required.

Under that act no one would deny that a Govern-

or could have been impeached for not obeying a requisition
duly made in the form prescribed by the law of 1793.

The

State law was as imperative and unconditional as the Constitutional clause itself.
years.

This law was in force thirty-three

Meanwhile eases must have arisen involving a con-

flict of jurisdiction .

.

.

.

. and as appears from subse-

quent legislation the character of them was misconceived.
It was thought that they constituted an exception to the

I

ordinary obligation of the Governor to deliver up."
Other States having Statutes to the same effect are, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Connecticut, and Maine.

These appear to

have been passed under the same mistaken view, i. e. a

con-

fliet of jurisdiction between the executive and judiciary.
The judicial department was entirely capable of taking care
of its own rights by the writ of habeas corpus.

The demand

being made the act of Congress declares that, *it shall be
the duty of the Executive authority of the State" to cause
the fugitive to be arrested and secured, and delivered to
the agent of the demanding State.

In Kentucky V, Dennison

(24 How.) the Court said; "the words, it shall be the duty,"

I in ordinary legislation imply the assertion of the power to
But looking to the sub-

command and to coerce obedience.

ject matter of this law

.

....

the court is of the opin-

ion that the words *it shall be the duty" were not used as
mandatory and copulsory of the moral duty which this cornpact created, when Congress had provided the mode of carrying it into execution."
eepted.

This doctrine is universally ac-

But, it is also acceded that the several States,

as States,'may compel the performance of this "dutyw by
appropriate legislation, and, as a fact, nearly all of the
States now have Statutory provisions stating, that on demand
of the executive authority of another State for a fugitive
from justice from that State the demand shall be honored
and the fugitive delivered up, according to the Constitution
and the act of Congress of 1793.
Some of these statutory provisions are but mere
repititions of the clause in the Constitution, and of the
Act of 1793, as in New York, Alabama, and California.

But

unfortunately, all State legislation has not stopped at this
point.

Some of the States have considered it conducive to

the ends of justice, and the liberty of its citizens, to prescribe rules for the governing of its Executive authority in
I both making, and receiving demands from the other States,
which, are plainly inconsistent with the spirit, and the
text of the Constitution, and the law of Congress, and hence,
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can be of no force.

Even the executive of the State,

merely by virtue of his "executive discretion', has, in rendition cases, assumed powers completely beyond the scope of
his authority--as in the case between Governor Mifflin, of
Pennsylvania and Governor Randolph, of Va., which was the
occasion of Congress passing the act of 1793.

ThqfState

legislation was the outcome of the growth of the 'executive
discretion'.

The idea as to what really was the "Duty"of

the executive, in a given case, began to cause a diversity
of opinion, for each one understood the obligation resting
upon him, in a different light; and thus, to the complicity
of conceptions among the State executives, and again, to the
dicta of the judges in some of the extradition cases, assert
ing that it was a right of the State to augment the provision in the Constitution, and the act of Congress by apprepriate State legislation, can we attribute the non-uniformity, and incorrectness of the several State laws respecting
i inter-State Extradition.

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,

Ohio, Deleware, Connecticut, California and Louisiana, have
at the present time laws which are distinctly unconstitutional.
!Statutes,

For instance; section 95 of the Ohio revised
as amended in 1884 contains the following provi-

sion, that in a case of complaint, the copy of the instrument must be accompanied by "an affidavit, or affidavits,

to the facts constituting the offense charged, by persons
having actual knowelede thereof." The inconsistency of this
clause with the act of Congress is comprehensively stated
by Spear, on the Law of Extradition (p. 231)He says; "there
is no constitutional objection to this provision when the
Governor of Ohio demands the delivery of a fugitive

...

,

since then the rights of that State are not involved in the
• requirement.

But when the demand is addressed by the gov-

ernor of another State to the governor of Ohio, then according to this provision, the "affidavit made before a magistrate" provided for by the law of Congress, will not be
sufficient, unless it be supplemented by the "affidavit or
affidavits" provided for by the law of Ohio.
attempt by the local law of a State to add, .

This is an
.

.

.

. to the

conditions of the obligations of delivery established by the
i supreme law of the land, which law is alike applicable and
authoritative in all the States.
It is an attempt to change this law as the rule by
which the Governor of Ohio is to be controlled in delivering
up fugitive criminals, and hence as the rule by which the
Governor of other States are to be controlled in asking for
a delivery from the Governor of Ohio.

It will not be suf-

ficient for them to comply with the law of Congress, unless
they also comply with this particular in the law of Ohio".

In Kentucky V. Dennison (24 How. 66) The Governor of Ohio in
direct violation of the Constitutional provision that "full
faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and Judicial proceedings of every other
state",

claimed that an indictment against one (ago which

was found by a grand jury in Kentucky, according,to the
Statutes of that State, would not hold good in the State of
Ohio.

Governor Dennison, in his refusal to comply with the

demand, said, "A line must be drawn somewhere'.

But, the

United States Supreme Court delivered the following opinion
on the subj ect:

"When the demand was made,

the proofs re-

quired by the act of 1793 to support it were exhibited to
the Governor of Ohio. duly certified,

and authenticated;

and

the objection made to the validity of the indictment is
altogether untenable.

Kentucky has an undoubted right to

regulate the forms of pleading and process in her own
courts, in criminal as well as civil cases, and is not bound
to conform to those of any other State.

And whether the

charge against Xago is legally and sufficiently laid in the
indictment

.

.

.

. is a judicial question to be decided by

the courts of the State(Kentucky) and not by the executive
authority of the State of Ohio".

Since the decision of

this case the very same question came before the United
States Supreme Court in, Reggel V. United States,

(114 U.S.,

17
642) and it was decided on the same ground as Kentucky V.
Dennison.

The greatest assumption of State power in any of

the State legislatures is shown in Massachusetts (General
Statutes, chap. 177,

l)

There the Statute provides that

a complaint from a demanding executive of another State must

i

'be accompanied by affidavits to the facts constituting the
offense charged, by persons having actual knowledge thereof;
and such further evidence in support thereof as the Governor
may require.*

The assumption of power in this provision is

simply astonishing.

It not only authorizes the Governor to

act in accordance with the law of Congress, and the law of
Massachusetts, but also to require "such further evidence in
support" of the'complaint" as he may think necessary or
expedient.

These two examples of State legislation are but

the prototype of the legislation of the five other States
above mentioned.

Now what does the Constitution mean when

it says that no State shall "enter into any agreement or

]compact

with another State (Art. 1, Sec. 10, cl.2)?

And

i what is the relation of a State which says that its executive authority shall follow one certain prescribed form of
procedure in the rendition of a "fugitive from justice," or
whose executive authority himself publishes that he will
hold himself to a certain form of procedure; to a State
demanding the rendition of a fugitive from that State?

What remedy has a State who, acting under its own laws, refuses to conform to those of another State on the ground
that the Constitution, and the act of Congress does not require it?

Simply no remedy at all, for it is exclusively

within the discretion of the executive, and there is absolutely no way to compel him (otherWiao than by his own
State) to make a rendition unless he so sees fit. (Kentucky
V. Dennison, Reggel V. U.S.)

There is only one way in

which to obviate the anomaly in this State legislation i.e.
for Congress to take up the work begun in 1793 and complete
it.

The class of crimes for which the surrender is to be made.
The second point that is expressly set out in the
provision of the Constitution, is the class of crimes for
which it shall be the *duty* of the State to surrender a
fugitive.

Once again is the struggle over this provision

in the Constitution shown, in this second class.

What the

intention was of those who incorporated into the Constitution
the words "treason, felony, or other crime', as to their
meaning, at one time presented a serious question for discussion, and "the ends of justice" were more than once
defeated by the different constructions put upon these words.
By some it has been held that the phrase applies only to

such acts as were crimes under the laws of the several
States when the Constitution was adopted.

Others have

.,,
claimed that it means only those acts that are criminal by
the laws of the State from which the fugitive is demanded,
as well as by the laws of the State making the demand.
Others have adopted the theory that the phrase denotes only
"offenses known as crimes at the common law, or recognized as
such by the State of which the fugitive is demanded".

Still others have held that the phrase embraces "all such
acts as are made criminal by the laws of the State where
they are perpetrated" (Hurd's Habeas Corpus, pp. 601,602.)
The question has twice come before the U. S. Supreme Court
(Kentucky V. Dennison 24How.,66. Taylor V. Taintor 16 Wall.2
366) and at both times it has been held that. "Every violation of the criminal laws of a State is within the meaning
of the Constitution, and may be made the foundation of a
requisition".
the States.

This decision has been adopted by all of
Although it includes all from the gravest

felony, to the petty misdemeanor, still, as no person is
likely to flee from a State to escape a petty misdemeanor,
or if he does that the State will pursue him and bring him
back for trial and punishment, there can come no injustice
from it.

But, if so required the State is under obligation

to give him up.

(Spear on Extradition, 357, 358.)

The Power in Congress to Regulate the Means for the
Rendition of Fugitives inter-State.
When the Constitution was framed it was confidently
believed that a sense of justice and of mutual interest
would insure a faithful execution of this Constitutional
provision by the Executive of every State, for every State
had an equal interest in the execution of this provision,
so absolutely essential to their peace and well-being in
their internal concerns, as well as members of the union.
But we can see from the words used in this provision, that
it was also intended to be made obligatory, resting on all
/

the States alike, and was not left merely to what one State
should consider to be justice, or called for by the law of
comity.

Like other provisions in the Constitution the

meaning and scope of this provision had to be explained,
and this duty devolved upon Congress in the following
manner.

In the year 1790 Governor Mifflin, of Pennsylvania

addressed a communication to Governor Beverly Randolph, of
Virginia, in which he represented that three persons, then
in Virginia, had kidnapped a free negro in Pennsylvania,
and sold him into slavery in Virginia, and requested their
surrender that they might be tried and punished under the
laws of Pennsylvania.

He accompanied the request with the

copy of an indictment found against these parties, certified

by hthe prothonotary of the court.

Governor Randolph refused

Sthe request., on the ground that the act charged was not a

crime in Virginia, "but only a trespass or a breach of the
peace,"

and was not included in the provision of the Consti-

tution, and the further ground that there could be no surren
der of fugitive criminals under the Constitution, until the
provision should be supplemented by legislation defining the
manner of carrying it into effect.

Governor Mifflin then

sent all the papers to President Washington.

These papers

were referred to Mr. Edmund Randolph the Attorney-General of
the U.S., who prepared a careful opinion upon the whole subject.

The President then submitted the whole matter to Con-

gress, and the result was that Congress passed a bill which
was approved by the President and on February 12, 1793 it
became a law. (American Law Review, vol. 13,pp.181-243)(For
bill, see appendix.)

This constitutes the whole law of Con-

gress on this subject.

The constitutionality of this act

being questioned it was brought before the United States
Supreme Court,

(Prigg V.

Commonwealth 16 Peters) where it

was expressly declared to be within the powers vested in
Congress.

Mr. Justice Story in delivering the opinion of P

Court said: "No one has ever supposed that Congress could
constitutionally, by its legislation, exercise powers or
enact laws beyond the powers delegated to it by the Con-

tution.

But it has, on various qccasions, exercised powers

which were necessary and proper as means to carry into effect rights expressly given and duties expressly enjoined
thereby.

The end being required, it has been deemed a just

and necessary implication that the means to accomplish it
are given also, or in other words that the power follows as

,

a necessary means to accomplish the end".

With the decision

of this case, virtually ended all questioning of the authority of Congress to legislate on this provision, and up to
the present day this act has been used as the basis for all
inter-State extradition.

But the requirements of to-day

are different from what they,were in 1793.

By the intro-

duction of the telegraph and the railroad the facility for
the escape of the criminal is greatly increased.

And again;

by the passing of arbitrary State laws, before mentioned,
this provision has at times been reduced almost to a nulity,
by reason of the technicalities required; the result of
which is an escape of the fugitive by a release under the
State habeas corpus. (Robb V. Connelly 111 U.S. 624)
The exigencies of to-day call for an exercise of that power

j

acknowledged to be in Congress, reducing to one uniform

practice of procedure all law respecting the inter-State
extradition of fugitive criminals, whereby the administration of criminal justice may be made uniform throughout the

23

Union, as it was intended that it should be by those who
framed our Constitution in the National Convention of 1793.
For the object of that provision in our Constitution stating
that it "shall be the duty" to give up a fugitive criminal,
was to aid each State in the administration of its own laws,
leaving it to judge what those laws shall be.

But if a

State asked to make the surrender of a fugitive criminal,
isso far as the performance of this "duty" is concerned,
also to be the judge of what those laws shall be, then, @8
remarked by Chief Justice Taney in Kentucky V. Dennison,
(24 How. 66) it would be better to omit the provision altogether and to leave the whole matter to be settled by
State comity without any constitutional regulation.
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Apendix
United States Constitution.
Article IV. Section 2- Clause 2A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony,
or other Crime, who shall flee from Jus-ice, and be found in
another State, shall on Demand of the execauive Authority
of the State from which he fled, be delivered

up

to be

r'emoved to The State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

United States Revised Statutes, Section 5278.
OWhenever the executive autho.iy of any State o±
Te ritory

demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of

the executive authority of any State or Territory to which
s&eh person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment
found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State
or ToritOrY,

charging the person demanded with having

committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as
authentioc by the Governor or Chief Magistrate of the State
or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to
be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest
to be given to the executive authority making such demand
or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the
fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such
agent when he shall appear.

If no su.ch agent appears with-

in six months from the time of arrest, the prisoner may be
discharged.

All costs or expenses incurred in the appre-

hending,.securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the
State or Territory making such demand, shall be paid by
such State or Territory.
'Section 5279.

Any agent so appointed who receives the

fugitive into his custody shall be empowered to transport
him to the State or Territory from which he has fled.
And every person who, by force, sets at liberty or rescues
the fugitive from such agent while so transporting him,
shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be
imprisoned not more than one year."

